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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to further explore some of the questions 
raised at a Task Force Meeting held at IIASA in June 1980 and entitled: 
Decision Support Systems: Issues and Challenges. The discussion 
attempts to focus attention on the need for a better understanding of 
management behavior in the context of decision support systems (DSS). 
The paper introduces the concept of mental representations, that is, sub- 
jective representations managers have of their management activity and 
environmect. It deplores the little attention devoted so far by DSS 
research to the importance of these representations in the decision- 
making process. A proposal is put forth that would enable managers to 
formalize their mental representations in order to use them in the course 
of their management activity. The paper concludes that unless managers 
can (and t h n k  that they can with a reasonable amount of effort) imprint 
onto their DSS the complexity and subjectivity of their own thinking, 
there is a serious doubt as to whether DSS will ever have wide application 
in management. 
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INTRODUrnON 
What kind of support would managers like to have; what kind of assis- 
tance do they really need; and how can decision support systems (DSS) 
help them? Until these questions have been properly addressed, how can 
we talk about DSS design and development, let alone implementation and 
evaluation? These questions are now topical in DSS research and are  
characteristic of a field that is attempting to transcend the technology to  
which it owes its existence. 
Decision support system is somewhat of a misnomer as i t  implies 
post-decision support rather than the intended pre-decision support. A 
more accurate name might have been: Decision making support systems. 
Moreover, the term is still not well understood and no agreed upon defini- 
tion as yet exists. 1 define DSS very generally to include all systems that  
support the decision-making pr.ocess in such a way as to improve 
managerial effectiveness. By "system" I mean a complex whole compris- 
ing a professional worker or workers (e.g. managers, researchers, profes- 
sionals, staff analysts, and clerical workers whose primary responsability 
is the handling of information in some form), a set of tools (usually, but 
not necessarily, computerized), and, when different from the user, a sys- 
tem designer or developer. "Support" here meazs to make possible or to. 
expand human capabilities for such activities as accessing facts, retriev- 
ing information, making computations, comparisons, projections, models, 
simulations, decision trees, etc. "Decision making" implies the intellec- 
tual activities that might comprise a decision such as intelligence gather- 
ing, screening, classification and structuring of data, model construction, 
simulations, formulation and testing of alternatives, choice of approach 
and implementation strategies . The distinguishng feature of DSS is its 
objective to improve managerial effectiveness. 
At one of the earlier conferences on DSS in 1977 [3] concern for the 
manager had already surfaced, as evidenced by Carlson and Scott 
Morton's editorial comments: 
The development of DSS has been stimulated more by 
increasing sophistication in technology than by better  
understanding of decision makers or decision making. 
A t  a more recent conference held a t  IIASA in 1980 [7] DSS researchers 
agreed on the necessity to  de-emphasize the technological problems and 
to pay more attention to the behavioral and organizational design issues. 
Dempster, in h s  closing remarks, echoed the feelings of the participants 
when he said: 
the misguided technological thrust in management and 
information science during the last two or three 
decades has been caused in part by our poor under- 
standing of organizational behavior, of the manage- 
ment task environment, and of human learning. 
Gorry and Scott Morton [9] articulate the problem as follows: 
Although the evolution of information systems activi- 
ties in most organizations has led to the accumulation 
of a variety of technical skills, the impact of computers 
on the way in which top managers make decisions has 
been minimal. One major reason for t h s  is that the 
support of these decision makers is not principally a 
technical problem. If it were it would have been solved. 
Certainly there are technical problems associated with 
work in these problem areas, but the'technology and 
the technological skills in most large organizations are 
more than sufficient. The m i s s k g  ingred ien t ,  a p a r t  
)'Tom the  bas ic  a w a r e n e s s  of the  prob lem,  is the ski l l  t s  
elicit  f r o m  m a n a g e m e n t  its view of the  organi za t ion  
and  i f s  env i ronment ,  a n d  to formal i ze  m o d e l s  of t h i s  
view. 
This paper discusses how to provide the miss ing  ingred ien t  in the 
c ~ n t e x t  of DSS. The concept of m e n t a l  represen ta t ions ,  that is, subjec- 
tive representations managers have of their management activity and its 
environment, is introduced. The importance of these representations in 
the decision making process is discussed and a methodology to elicit 
them from the managers is proposed. Finally, the paper describes how 
the systematic use of these representations by means of a DSS could 
assist managers in their decision-making tasks. In summary, the paper 
presents a framework for the development of a DSS to elicit and formalize 
the view managers have of their organization and its environment. 
MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 
The decisions that we make in the course of our daily lives a re  based, 
to a large extent, on representations we have constructed of our own 
universe. Piaget [14] points out that all species inherit the basic ten- 
dency to systematize or organize their processes in coherent systems, 
namely, the tendency to form mental models. The quality of even the 
most mundane decisions depends, among other things, on the quality of 
these mental models. But because we tend to use them instinctively, 
most of us would be hard pressed to describe the various mental 
representations we use in making such decisions (I prefer talking of 
representations rather than models, the latter having too definitive a con- 
notation). I argue that the same holds true for managers. Mintzberg [13] 
aptly describes these representations as follows: 
A model is a n  abstraction of reality, a set of causal 
relationships by which the effects of give9 conditions 
can be predicted. One gets the impression, in listening 
t o  managers as they make decisions, that  they carry 
an array of such models in their heads ... In effect,the 
manager absorbs the information that  continually 
bombards h m  and forges it into a series of mental 
models of the internal workings of his organization, the 
behavior of subordinates, the trends in the 
organization's environment, the habits of associates, 
and so on. When choices must be made, these models 
can be used to test  alternatives ... The effectiveness of 
the manager's decisions is largely dependent on the 
quality of his models. 
When questioned or asked to  justify decisions, managers tend t o  
rationalize their choices; however, the representations they in fact use t o  
make decisions are  not the models one finds in a management science 
textbook. Their mental representations include their beliefs, be they 
* Italics are the author's. 
intuitive, unquantifiable, or political; their values, be they ethical, moral, 
or religious; their idiosyncrasies and peculiarities; their ambitions and 
hidden agendas; in other words, all the so-called unscient i f ic  factors. It is 
not surprising that students of management have not yet dared to ven- 
ture into t h s  marshland, preferring the solid ground of rationality. 
Managers for their part have not been forthcoming in making explicit 
their decision-making processes. Perhaps they do not want to do so 
because, on the one hand they may not know exactly how they reach deci- 
sions, and on the other, they may fear revealing confidential details, in 
particular details concerning the "unscientific" factors of their mental 
representations. Thus, mental representations have not been made expli- 
cit and suitable approaches to this task are still lacking. I contend that 
mental representations, even with their unscient i f ic  factors, are impor- 
tant in the decision-making process and therefore pertinent to the effec- 
tiveness of the managers. If we are serious about aiding managers to 
improve their effectiveness, we must venture into the morass. 
The intellectual processes which lead to a management decision 
must necessarily operate within the context of the mental representa- 
tions. It is by no means clear how mental representations help managers 
decide--and hence how improvements to the representations would 
enable managers to make better decisions. However, the representations 
which managers use instinctively when they make decisions, are a t  the 
root of their managerial effectiveness. In order to be truly useful to the 
managers, DSS must take them into account. 
Unfortunately, the development of DSS has so far paid far too little 
attention to the importance of managerial representations in the 
decision-making process. As a result, the present DSS systems are either 
too simple to take the representations into account (in which case it may 
be argued that we do not really have a DSS), or the costs to managers in 
time and effort necessary to articulate and incorporate the representa- 
tions into such systems are prohibitive (or a t  least appear to be so). 
If we accept that managers carry in their i~aads mental representa- 
tions of their management activity and environment, and if we believe 
that  these representions are at  the root of their managerial effectiveness, 
then the objective of DSS to improve managerial effectiveness becomes 
clearer: it is, among other things, to enable managers to access, improve 
. . 
and make better use of these mental representations. 
ELICITATION PROCESS: A TECHNIQUE 
There are several ways of eliciting the views managers have of their 
organizations. The two most obvious are to ask for the subjective percep- 
tions of the managers involved or observe unobtrusively the actions of the 
managers in actual decision-making situations. In this paper, I opt for the 
former. 
A possible approach for eliciting mental representations by asking 
for the subjective perceptions of managers was developed by Eden [6]. 
Eden believes that some managers can benefit from, and are keen to 
spend the time, exploring their o m  thinking. He and his colleagues have 
developed a technique that would enable managers to  do so. The process 
can be viewed as a kind ol psychoanalysis for managers, an attempt to 
make explicit the fundamental psychological structures underlying their 
behavior. Eden's approach is relatively straightforward and not particu- 
larly time consuming which greatly enhances its appropriateness as a 
tool for eliciting the mental representations of managers. 
Eden and his group proceed in the following manner. The first step is 
to collect data from the managers on a specific activity. In this respect 
Eden does not restrict the approach to any one method. He does, how- 
ever, provide some guidelines: the purpose of the exercise must be clear 
a t  the outset; the technique chosen to collect data should capture the 
complexity of thinking, its peculiarities and idiosyncrasies, its particulari- 
ties as well as its generalities, and it should stay within the reality of the 
managers; and the data collected must be such that it can be presented 
comprehensibly. The coding method they employ (see Appendix 1) was 
developed from the basic ideas Holsti and Wrightson used to code 
documents and texts describing the polit~cal activity of foreign policy 
leaders. 
Secondly, using the collected data, they develop cognitive maps (for 
an example see Appendix 2) to capture the interplay of the concepts 
which managers have about their worlds. Constructing corresponding 
interaction matrices provides a formal representation of the maps. Data 
entry and map construction and analysis is done with the aid of the com- 
puter. 
Thrdly, a software package, COPE (Cognitive Policy Evaluation), is 
also used in presenting results to the managers. I t  provides twc levels of 
analysis. The first can handle questions such as: If I can describe an 
event in the following way, what theories (or paths linking concepts: A 
gives rise to B, C can be explained by D, etc.) do I bring to bear to explain 
the occurrence of thq event? and, What theories do I use that enable me 
to predict future consequences of a n  event occurring? The second level 
of analysis answers questions such as: Can the event, described as follows, 
be explained through a sequence of theories by the occurrence of another 
event? and, Does the occurrence of an  event have consequences for a par- 
ticular concept? 
Eden's approach could be used in the context of a DSS system to 
enable managers to articulate the mental representations they have of 
their management activity and environment. I envisage the following kind 
of DSS. Managers first input their thoughts about their management 
activity and environment in a formal way. The program interacts with the 
manager in a stylized English-like dialogue (questions and answers). 
Replying to a series of structured questions enables managers to  describe 
the concepts they have of their management activity and its environment 
and to define the theories linking them. Based on those replies, the pro- 
gram elicits the managers' mental representations and constructs visual 
maps of them. Managers can then review and when necessary revise 
those maps. Finally, when faced with a decision or confronted with an 
issue, managers use a "COPE type" program to assess the consequences 
of actions, to explore possible courses of action in order to obtain a 
desired result, or simply use the system as a "check list" or "sounding 
board". 
Two other instances where similar approaches have been used in the 
context of decision making are worth mentioning here. The first is a 
"situation-based" system, as opposed to a "knowledged-based" system, 
called GODDESS (A Goal-Directed Decision Structured System) developed 
at UCLA by Pearl, Leal, and Saleh [15]. The system assists managers in 
structuring and searching their o m  knowledge (e.g. state relations 
among aspects, effects, conditions, and goals in addition to actions and 
states which are the basic components of the traditional decision tree 
approach) in a decision-making situation. The second is a method of 
computer assisted learning developed a t  the London Graduate School of 
Business Studies by Boxer [2]. The method enables managers to explore 
the value of their experience in relation to a particular problem context; 
to consider how their own experience relates to that of other managers; 
and finally to create design criteria for strategic options capable of com- 
manding a consensus between managers. Wh~lst both approaches impli- 
citly make use of mental representations, neither seem to offer managers 
the capability of exploring their own thinking in a more general way nor 
of storing and subsequently accessing (in the course of problem solving or 
of reflecting on managerial issues) the resulting formal representations. 
ELICITATION PROCESS: THE MILIEU 
The introspective qualities required for the elicitation process are 
uncharacteristic of today's managers [13]. Even if managers did possess 
the means to express their mental representations, would they have the 
time, inclination and aptitudes necessary to do so without any assistance? 
Managers may need to be convinced not only of the benefits which accrue 
to them and their organization from such an exercise but also of the need 
for the effort required by them. It may very wel! be, therefore, that busy 
managers will require the assistance of an analyst to articulate their 
mental representations. 
* Given the differences among cognitive styles, the possibility cer- 
tainly exists that the analyst's style will be at odds with that of the 
manager. Mathes [12] perhaps summarized it best when he said: 
"Managerial people analyze problems on the basis of differences or 
changes in situations. Scientific people look for similarities or common 
elements." According to Mason and Mitroff i1 I], designers of management 
systems have tended to project their dominant psychological type onto 
that of their clients. Thls must not happen in the case of the proposed 
DSS because the cognitive style of the manager needs to be at the centre 
' ~ x c e r ~ t  from Benbasat's article [I]: There are a number of theoretical models on the na- 
ture of cognitive styles. Schsoeder characterizes individuals as abstract versus concrete, 
where abstract types are able to handle and integrate more information cues than concrete 
types. Huysman differentiates between analytics, who use a planr~ed model-based quantita- 
tive approach and heuristics, who use intuition and search for analogies and feedback in de- 
cision rmaking. Keen categorizes decision makers as systematics versus intuitives on the 
problem solving dimension and as preceptives, that is, focussing on patterns and deviations 
from norms, versus receptives that is, direct examination of all data, on :he data-gathering 
dimension. Driver and Mock distinguish between maximal and minimal data users on one di- 
mension, and between individuals who wodd support one conclusion versus the ones who 
would put various interpretations on data and thus support various solutions with the same 
data, on a second dimension. Finally, Witkin defines individuals as field independents who 
have the ability to dehea t e  and structure a given whole, or as field dependents who show a 
global point of view and for whom the organization of a field as a whole dictates the way i t s  
parts are experienced. 
of the elicitation process. Support should therefore be in the form of 
coaching, which implies that the managers develop the representations 
themselves but that they do so with the aid, support, and encouragement 
of the analysts. 
The need for privacy when articulating mental representations and 
the confidential nature of of these representations is a delicate problem. 
We certainly cannot expect managers to divulge their innermost thoughts 
about their organization without some assurance as to  the privacy and 
confidentiality of the process. This means that  the computer processing 
must either be in the form of a mini- or micro-computer which is physi- 
cally located in the manager's office or  a terminal (also in the manager's 
office) equipped with an encryption device and hardware key [5] 
How we reconcile the need for the intervention of an analyst with the 
question of privacy and confidentiality is a very difficult question for 
which no general prescription is possible. Acceptable solutions will only 
emerge as  a result of understanding on the part of the analyst and t rus t  
on the part of the manager. 
USING F O W A L  REPRESENTATIONS 
Managerial effectiveness depends not only on the quality of "cor- 
porate" decisions--managers make very few of those individually--but also 
on "day to day" decisions like: What kind of report should I submit to my 
superior? How can I best present this new idea to my colleagues? How 
can I motivate John re  the Three Star project? What will be Mary's reac- 
tion to my new resource allocation scheme? When thinking about such 
decisions managers bring to mind the mental representations that are 
most pertinent to the situation. Withln the context of tnese representa- 
tions, they then seek and review information of relevance. This is where 
DSS can be useful. DSS can improve managerial effectiveness by enabling 
managers to extend their mental representations to incorporate all infor- 
mation pertinent to them and yet avoid or a t  least diminish the sys- 
tematic biases managers have when processing large amounts of informa- 
tion. In fact, mental representations can provide a most natural and most 
convenient structure for managers to store information effectively. As 
Chase and Simon [4]  have explained, the development of expertise can in 
part, involve the storage of meaningful patterns of information. 
If we are to support the managerial decision-making process we must 
rely on the strengths of both the managers and the computer aids. We 
must have the  two working as a team. Unfortunately, managers tend to 
have a holistic, broad, and somewhat nebulous vision of their activity, 
organization and environment, whereas computer systems tend to pic- 
ture the world as exact discrete facts which are later built into a more 
complete description. As Lee [ l o ]  points out: "The real challenge of DSS 
research is to find a useful working relationship between these extremes 
of cognitive style." Indeed, a relationship where the computer system 
complements the cognitive weaknesses of the manager. 
With the aid of the computer, managers could easily: 
search out from a given concept to any level of related con- 
cepts; 
follow a path of adjoining links between concepts; 
review all associated concepts using a keyword search func- 
tion; 
review the various networks of contacts (political, organiza- 
tional, technical, or other) associated with any given concept 
or group of concepts. 
Of course the formal representations and the information they contain 
would have to be stored in such a way as to allow such manipulations. 
Given such a powerful aide-memoire, managers would be better able to: 
assess and store new information by relating it quickly and 
accurately to the appropriate concepts; 
assess the ramifications of various courses of action by exa- 
mining the links between concepts in the representations; 
perform "what if" or contingency analyses for the same rea- 
son; 
*. explore new ideas or associations between concepts. 
Managers are able to perform the above operations without the aid of 
the computer and do so all the time. However, the computer can extend 
the mental representations, that is, increase the information captured by 
each representation well beyond the limits of human cognitive capacity. 
Therein lies the strength of the machtne, its "mechanical" capacity to 
store large quantities of data without any loss in either the quality of the 
data or the ability to manipulate it. The real gain, however, is in over- 
coming the systematic biases (e.g. the tendancy to give undue weight to 
recent information) managers have when processing large amounts of 
information, as would be the case for their mental representations. 
Humans attempt to  minimize "cognitive strain" when required to  
handle uncertainty. Judgmental heuristics [16] by which uncertainty is 
reduced can be of the following kind: 
representativeness, whereby the probability of an  event is 
judged by how representative--i,e. similar in 
characteristics-the event is to the process from rrhch it is 
supposed to have been generated; for example, given a 
description of a student in h g h  school and asked to  identify 
his area of graduate specialization, people will tend to ignore 
the general distribution of graduate students among special- 
izations and rely solely on the five year old profile; 
availabiLity, whereby the probability of an event is judged by 
the ease with which similar instances come to mind; for 
example, homicide, cancer, tornodoes are overestimated as 
causes of death whereas asthma, emphysema, diabetes are  
underestimated; 
a n c h o r i n g  a n d  a d j u s t i n g ,  whereby one estimates a quantity 
by starting from a suggested value and making adjustments 
from it; for examlpe, we are all aware of how difficult it is to 
overcGme first impressions. 
Relying on these heuristics results in people making biased decisions or 
failing to make adequate use of the information they have (as illustrated 
in the examples given). However, with the use of the kind of DSS 
described here, managers would use the information available more effec- 
tively, thereby reducing the need for misleading heuristics. 
The views expressed in t h s  section are in sympathy with those of 
Gorry [8] who demonstrated that even simple descriptive models can help 
managers find the right problems to solve. Gorry's interest in such simple 
models, which he calls managerial models, stems from his belief that they 
are central to  managerial decision making; that they expand the limited 
capacity of managers to use information effectively; and that to the 
extent that these models can be discovered and ways found to improve 
them, there is hope of directly increasing managerial effectiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
DSS constitute a new field of information science aimed at  bringing 
computer technology closer to managers. It is very much a child of 
recent advances in computer technology (e.g. mini- and micro- 
computers, time sharing, etc.). So far DSS have remained a captive of 
this new technology and their developments have been characterized by a 
general lack of insight into managerial behavior. A s  experience has 
shown, disregard for the concerns of managers can slow down the 
development and implementation of a new system and ultimately result 
in its underutilization-if not eventual total failure. 
Managers appear most comfortable with those management tools 
that  they can personalize or manipulate to reflect their own thinking. In 
the case of DSS, the systems developed so far are either too simple or too 
rigid to allow managers to  do sp. The ways and means by w h c h  the views 
of managers can be formalized, the m i s s i n g  i n g r e d i e n t  according to 
Gorry and Scott Morton [9], has been the subject of t h s  paper. I have 
introduced the concept of mental representations and have proposed a 
technique recently used by Eden [6] to construct cognitive maps to elicit 
them. I have also discussed the functions and possible uses of a DSS 
based on mental representations. 
Unless managers can (and think that they can with a reasonable 
amount of effort) imprint onto their DSS the complexity and subjectivity 
of their own thnking, there is a serious doubt as to whether DSS will ever 
have wide application in management. 
In t h s  paper I have introduced, in the context of a DSS, a scheme 
whereby mental representations managers have of their activity and 
environment could improve their decision-making ability. The next step 
is to examine decision-making cases, both in the public and private sec- 
tor, in order to identify if and how the proposed approach would improve 
the final decisions. It is clear, however, that only through the actual 
application of the method can concrete evidence emerge to support the 
merit of the proposed approach. 
APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE CODING TECHNIQUE USED BY 
EDENC 
Let c be a group of words descibing the object of coding consideration; it 
may be qualitative or quantitative, a subjective concept or an easly opera- 
tionalized object. Let a and b be a group of words describing the oppo- 
site poles (if such exist) of the state of the concept c .  Either pole may be 
void, or it may be that both poles are left void, in which case the concept 
c is subjet to a monotonic increase or decrease in potential states. Thus 
in the concept "increased delinquency", a = increased, b is void, and c = 
delinquency. Then two concepts may be related by an arrow with a +ve or 
-ve sign. For clarity, and subsequently for computer recognition, the 
poles are separated by slashes, thus: 
*Taken from Eden's book entitled "Thinking in Organizations" [6]. 
Note that if one pole is void it is convenient to combine a and c so that a 
double slash appears which more obviously suggests the occurrence of a 
void pole. 
An assertion is coded using three slashes--thus suggesting, implicitly, 
two void poles without the further implication of a monotonic relation- 
ship. Thus the previous example is coded: 
/ / /bad  planning in the 1950s -+ /bad/good/housing 
A MORE FORMAL STATEMENT 
Monotonic- Monotonic 
c -+(-)cz gives: 
"an increase in c can lead to an increase (decrease) in c2, or 
"an decrease in c l  can lead to a decrease (increase) in cZ1', or 
"an increase (decrease) in cz can be explained by an increase in 
cl'), or 
"a decrease (increase) in c2 can be explained by a decrease in 
c 
Monotonic-Bipolar 
/ a l /  b I /  c , / - + ( - ) c 2  gives: 
" a l c  can lead to an increase (decrease) in c2", or 
" b  l c l  can lead to a decrease (increzse) in cZ1' ,  or 
"an increase (decrease) in 122 can be explained by a l c  1", or 
"a decrease (increase) in c2 can be explained by b  l c l " .  
The reverse of this relationship behaves similarly. 
Bipolar-Bipolar 
/ a l /  b l /  c  l /  -+(-I/ a 2 /  b 2 /  c 2 /  gives: 
" a , c  can lead to a z c 2 ( b 2 c 2 ) " ,  or 
" b l c l  can lead to b2c2(a2c2)" ,  or 
"a2c  can be explained by a ,c , ( b  ,c ,)", or 
" b 2 c z  can be explained by b l c l ( a l c  
/ a l c  ,/ / -+(-I/ a2 /  b 2 /  c 2 /  gives: 
" a l c  can lead to a 2 c z ( b 2 c 2 ) " ,  or 
"azc  2 ( b  2c 2 )  can be explained by a ,c l  ". 
Assertions 
/ / / c ,  - - - - + + c 2  gives: 
" c ,  can lead to an increase in c2", or 
"a decrease in c 2  may be because c  ,", or 
"an increase in cz  may be because c , " .  
/ / / c ,  -+/ a 2 /  b 2 /  c 2  gives: 
" a 2 c 2  may be because c ," ,  or 
" b z c z  may be because c l " .  
/ / / c , - + /  / / c 2  gives: 
"c2 may be because c  ,". 
An assertion may be explained by a previous concept but the 
previous concept may not have the consequence of an assertion. 
VOID POLES 
Void poles are important for several reasons: 
(i) they indicate possible intervention strategies that have 
never previously been considered (thus their being void). 
(ii) a void pole can lead to a suggested loop (that is a path 
formed by the edges) not being a loop in the cognitive 
sense, thus the figure below is not a negative feedback loop 
because of the existence of void poles. 
A Void Loop 
(iii) a void pole can have been properly coded as such but not 
represent a good cognitive map. This occurs when the  
client has only ezpressed one pole but psychologically 
treats it as bipolar. A situation of this sort is usually 
corrected during feedback. 
APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE OF A COGNITIVE MAP* 
/Recog~zlng/Not recogniz~ng/chwrman's 
own constraints and views 
/Alwayn/Not always /going 
t h m q h  policy rlth chairman 
carefully in advance 
/Relatlonshlp of mutual trust 
and respect/Lack of conddenre 
///Chairman ha8 very high 
stnading In party group \+ 
/Chairman doea/~hairman does not/ 
accept JS'r diagnosis of sttuatfon 
/ 
L + 
/Chairman can usually persuade /Members tend to dislike 
party coUeaguer U he supports apaodlng money on more stad/ / 
a policy// 
/Obtarning/Not obtalarrrg Poasible c o a c t s  with 
chaurnan's fupport other depts and committees 
Morale of JS's dept 
/Committee approvmg/Committee not approving/ 
\- 
proposals for Lncreared stall for JS's dept 
/Improved/Reduced/emciency 
+ of hous~ng wellare and management 
roc tion 
Some of M r .  Saunders' beliefs about the importance of the Chairman of 
Committee, relating here to the question of staffing. 
*Taken from Ede~l's  book entitled "Thinking in Organizations" [a]. 
REF'ERENCES 
1. Benbasat, I. Cognitive S ty le  C o d e r a t i o n s  in DSS Design. Proceed- 
ings of a Conference on Decision Support Systems. Quarterly 
Newsletter of the Special Interest Group on Business Data Processing 
of the Association for Computing Machinery, Vol 8, No.3 (Winter 
1977), pp.37-38. 
2. Boxer, P. J .  ReJlective Analysis .  International Journal of Man-Machine 
Studies, 1979, 11. pp.547-584. 
3. Carlson, E. D. and Scott Morton, M. S. Editorial Comments .  Proceed- 
ings of a Conference on Decision Support Systems. Quarterly 
Newsletter of the Special Interest Group on Business Data Processing 
of the Association for Computing Machnery, Vol 8, No.3 (Winter 
1977), pp.2. 
4. Chase, W. G. and Simon H. A. 1973. The Mind's Eye in Chess. VislLaL 
I n f o r m a t i o n  Processing,  ed. W .  G. Chase, pp. 215-282. New York: 
Academic. 
5. Denning, D. E. S e c u r e  Personal Comput ing  in a n  Insecure  Network  
Communications of the ACM 22(8):476-482. 
6. Eden, C. , Jones, S. and Sims, D. 1979. Think ing  in Organizat ions .  The 
MacMillan Press Ltd. 
7. Fick, G. and Sprague R. H. Jr. 1980. Decision SLLpport S y s t e m :  I s s u e s  
a n d  Challen3es.  Proceedings of an  International Task Force Meeting. 
pp. 176. Pergamon Press. 
8. Gorry, G. A. The Development of Manager ia l  Models. Sloan Management 
Review, Vol 12, No.2, 1971. 
9. Gorry, G. A, and Scott Morton M. S. A Framework  for  M a n a g e m e n t  
I n f o r m a t i o n  S y s t e m .  Sloan Management Review (Fall 1971), 13(1), 
pp. 55-70. 
10. Lee, R. What Are D e c W n s .  DSS Bulletin (currentiy being launched by 
IIASA) . 
11. Mason, R. 0. and Mitroff I. I. A P r o g r a m  for  Research  o n  M a n a g e m e n t  
In forrnat ion  S y s t e m s .  Management Science, Vol. 19, No.5, 1973. 
12. Mathes, R. C. "17' People a n d  "S' People. Science (letter), Vol. 164 (9 
May 1969), pp.630. 
13. Mintzberg, H. 1973. The N a t u r e  of Managerial  Work, pp.89-90. New 
York: Harper and Row. 
14. Piaget, J. 1977. The d e v e l o p m e n t  of Thought:  E q u i l i b r i u m  of Cognit ive 
S t m c t u r e s .  Viking Press. 
15. Pearl, J. , Leal, A, and Saleh J. 1980. GODDES: A Goal- Directed Deci- 
sion Structured S y s t e m .  UCLA-ENG-CSL-8034, Cognitive Systems 
Laboratory, School of Engineering and Applied Science, University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
16. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment  u n d e r  Uncer ta in ty :  
Heurist ics a n d  Biases .  Science, Vol. 185. pp. 1124-1 131. 
